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Neuroscience and the Free Exercise of Religion
Steven Goldberg 
I. Introduction
Dr. Michael Persinger, a prominent neuroscientist and author, can
stimulate your right temporal lobe and quite possibly cause you to
experience a sense that something God-like is in the room. 1 Persinger draws
no small conclusions from this. “What is the last illusion that we must
overcome as a species?,” he asks. And he answers: “That illusion is that
God is an absolute that exists independent of the human brain – that
somehow we are in his or her care.” 2
Professor Michael Gazzaniga, head of a leading academic Center for
the Study of the Mind, relies on studies showing that specific parts of the
brain are activated when people make moral judgments to conclude that
religious teachings must give way to what he calls a “universal ethics.” 3 “It
is not a good idea to kill,” according to Gazzaniga, “because it is not a good
idea to kill, not because God or Allah or Buddha said it was not a good idea
to kill.” 4
Other scholars and commentators have supported variations on these
themes, concluding, for example, that modern neuroscience undermines
belief in a monotheistic God or in the Bible. 5 Still others maintain that brain
imaging studies fit perfectly with support for “militant atheism.” 6
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If these beliefs take hold in popular culture, they could, over time,
have substantial implications for the legal status of religion. If you look
across the United States and Europe you will see variation in how free
exercise of religion claims are handled, yet you will nonetheless see a broad
consensus that religious practices should be respected and tolerated unless
they disrupt public order. 7 But that consensus might erode if religion came
to be seen as simply a byproduct of biology and not a very attractive
byproduct at that. And, needless to say, the establishments of religion that
linger in some European countries 8 would also have difficulty surviving a
transformed view of religion as a branch of neurology.
Neuroscience will not, however, fundamentally undermine the social
and legal status of religion. We know this is so for two reasons. First, those
who believe brain science erases supernatural religion have logical and
philosophical hurdles they have not begun to surmount. Secondly, and more
importantly, the challenges that are being raised today have been with us for
over one hundred years and have had little to no impact.
II. Neuroscience, Metaphysics, and Ethics
As to the first point, there simply is a lot more intellectual work to be
done to make the case that neuroscience decisively undermines religious
belief. Persinger’s apparent belief that empirical testing can falsify
supernatural claims is baffling. Karl Popper himself made clear that science
simply cannot speak to the truth of metaphysics. That is the whole point of
saying that scientific claims must be falsifiable. Progress in science has
come from the recognition that the statement “God exists” is not scientific
because it is not testable. Thus alleged scientific proofs of God’s existence
are, in fact, undermined by the modern approach to science. But that is
completely different from saying that “God exists” is false. Science cannot
tell us that. 9
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As Popper himself put it, falsifiability is:
A criterion of demarcation between empirical science on the one hand
and pure mathematics, logic, metaphysics, and pseudo-science on the
other…. The broad line of demarcation between empirical science …
and … metaphysics … has to be drawn right through the very heart of
the region of sense – with meaningful theories on both sides of the
dividing line – rather than between the region of sense and nonsense. 10
But does Persinger level at least a practical attack on religion? Here,
too, his position is wanting. Suppose stimulation of the brain by a clinician
triggers a religious experience. That might undermine the faith of someone
who thought only God could trigger such an experience. But many people of
faith would have no difficulty in accepting that God can also do what a
clinician can do. After all, neuroscientific studies have shown that placebos
operate on the pathways of pain in much the same way as opiates. 11 If a
placebo can trigger the brain, it would be odd to suppose God could not.
And of course for many it is God who made sure in the first place that
people have brains that can experience the spiritual.
It is also hard to give great weight to Gazzaniga’s notion that our
knowledge of the brain will lead to a universal ethics which will supplant
traditional religions. First there is his apparent commission of the naturalistic
fallacy. He seems to assume that what is tells us what ought to be. But any
serious study of the brain, just like any serious study of the Bible, would turn
up substantial evidence that some people are predisposed to enslave others. 12
Yet that does not make slavery morally acceptable.
Even when brain science allegedly uncovers a helpful moral teaching,
Gazzaniga’s hope for a universal ethics is not very promising. He finds that,
in certain settings, people believe that we should not kill. But a cursory
(ed.) Judy Illes, Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy (Oxford, 2006), 289, 292293.
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glance around the globe suggests that we do, as a species, differ quite a bit
on issues like pacifism and capital punishment. In a world in which abortion
ranges from a crime to a constitutional right, we may have to put the
emergence of a universal ethics based on science on hold for a little while.

III. William James and the Lessons of History
Yet the biggest problem with the neuroscientific attack on religion is
that we have been through this before, and religion has emerged essentially
unscathed. By the early days of the twentieth century, medicine and science
had progressed to the point where the ecstatic experiences of great religious
leaders were often attributed to physical abnormalities: Saint Paul was
viewed as an epileptic, Saint Teresa as an hysteric, and so on. 13
It was against this backdrop that William James delivered the Gifford
Lectures on Natural Religion at the University of Edinburgh. James’ talks,
published in 1902 as The Varieties of Religious Experience, took as their
subject precisely the subjective experiences of those religious visionaries
who often fell into trances, heard voices, saw visions, and the like. 14 James
had no interest in the “ordinary religious believer who follows the
conventional observances” of Christianity or any other faith. 15 He said that it
“would profit us little to study this second-hand religious life” marked as it
was by “fixed forms of imitation and retained by habit.” 16 James was
interested precisely in people like Saint Paul.
As a philosopher and a psychologist who also had a medical degree,
James was well situated to address religion and the mind. And, indeed, he
began his talk by arguing that to “plead the organic causation of a religious
state of mind … in refutation of its claim to possess superior spiritual value
is quite illogical and arbitrary….” 17 We cannot improve upon the reason he
gave:
13
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[T]here is not a single one of our states of mind, high or low, healthy
or morbid, that has not some organic process as its condition.
Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as
religious emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimately
enough, we should doubtless see “the liver” determining the dicta of
the sturdy atheist as decisively as it does those of the Methodist…. 18
Today it is popular to give functional MRIs to see how the brain is
behaving when religious or moral sentiments are under consideration. In the
future it may be equally popular to scan the brains of scientists while they
think about dark matter or superstring theory or neuroscience itself. The
results may be fascinating, but they will tell us nothing about the merits of
the topics on the thinkers’ minds.
Since William James, the subject of the connection between our
physical selves and our religious beliefs has come up time and again. Just
fifteen years ago, when the Human Genome Project, rather than brain
scanning, was the reductionist theory of the day, the cover of Time
Magazine announced the discovery of The God Gene and asked “Does our
DNA compel us to seek a higher power?” 19
The God Gene turned out to be hard to pin down. But the bigger point
is that it scared very few people of faith. Just as with the results of MRIs, a
gene for religion that is seen by some as an evolutionary adaptation that
undermines God is taken by others as evidence that God himself has hard
wired us for faith. 20
Indeed in recent years, religious organizations, far from being cowed
by developments in brain science, have sponsored conferences that have
featured presentations on the compatibility of neuroscience and faith. At the
Woodstock Theological Center, Dr. Malcolm Jeeves argued that “all the
evidence in neuroscience points to us as a … unity….[T]here are these
intimate relations between mental life, emotional life and neural structures,
and its attempt to discredit the states which it dislikes, by vaguely associating them with nerves and liver,
and connecting them with names connoting bodily affliction, is altogether illogical and inconsistent.” ibid.
18
ibid.
19
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including the spiritual dimension.” 21 By the spiritual dimension, Jeeves said,
“I mean essentially a relationship with God however you formulate that.” 22
At the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences’ conference on
Neuroscience, Religious Experience and the Self, Professor David Ray
Griffin concluded that “the existence and persistence of religion,” including
“a direct experience … of a Holy Actuality” is consistent with the scientific
point of view. 23
It is reasonable to wonder why people of faith are comfortable with
neuroscience while many remain deeply troubled by the theory of evolution.
Neuroscience, after all, is completely embedded in and dependent on the
evolutionary framework: working neuroscientists are not likely to be
creationists.
While it is, of course, possible to reconcile evolution with belief in
God, there is no denying that Darwin’s work caused a crisis in traditional
religion. 24 Why is neuroscience not doing the same?
The reason is that evolution is not simply a set of facts, or a model, or
an increase in our knowledge about the material nature of human beings.
Evolution is a narrative. It is a story about who we are and where we are
going. From a human point of view, it is not a particularly uplifting
narrative, indeed it is not even centered on humans. And evolution is a
counter-narrative to that told by traditional religions. They tell a story in
which we are specially created and have a special destiny. Giving up a
central narrative that gives meaning to our existence is not easy.
Consider the argument put forward by Ron Carlson and Ed Decker in
their book, Fast Facts on False Teachings, in which they defend evangelical
Christianity and attack evolution. Carlson and Decker write that according to
evolution, “You are the descendant of a tiny cell of primordial protoplasm
washed up on an ocean beach 3 ½ billion years ago….You are a mere grabbag of atomic particles, a conglomeration of genetic substance…. [Y]ou
came from nothing, you are going nowhere.” 25 The Christian view, in
21
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contrast, says, “You are the special creation of a good and all-powerful God.
You are the climax of His creation…. [Y]]ou are unique…. Your Creator
love[s] you.” 26
Unlike evolution, neuroscience can be seen as simply providing a
deeper understanding of the wonderfully complex special brain that God has
given us. And those neuroscientists who think that the discipline’s
deterministic framework is somehow inconsistent with religion need to meet
some Calvinists.

IV. Incremental Legal Change As Law Reacts to Neuroscience

So neuroscience will not fatally undermine religion or fundamentally
erode its legal status. But that is only half of the story.
Recent research in brain science will play a role in the law in a
manner that is typical of scientific advances. The role will be modest rather
than grandiose, incremental rather than sweeping. Advocates for a party in a
dispute will seek to use current research findings as part of their effort to
advance their cause. If the courts judge the proffered evidence to be
sufficiently reliable the evidence will be admitted. It may then play a part in
the tribunal’s final decision. An individual litigated matter will not
necessarily have broad implications, but over time the underlying science
may become a feature of certain disputes.
Under this scenario, neuroscience could play a role in law and religion
disputes in the courtroom, just as it can play a role in other legal settings. Let
me give a hypothetical example to clarify my point before turning to a few
actual cases that have already arisen.
Under current law in many American states, parents can be excused
from their ordinary obligation to give their children traditional medical
treatment when the parents object on religious grounds. 27 Christian
Scientists are the main beneficiaries of this religious exemption. This
26

ibid 63.
For a discussion, with references, of the material in this paragraph, see Kei Robert Hirasawa, ‘Are
Parents Acting in the Best Interests of their Children When They Make Medical Decisions Based on Their
Religious Beliefs?’ (2006) 44 Family Court Review 318.
27

7

statutory exemption, where it exists, is not unlimited. Parents, regardless of
their religious beliefs, are never free to prevent their children from receiving
life saving care. But when a treatment is related to health rather than life,
and a parent chooses to use prayer rather than conventional medicine, that
parent will be immune from child neglect charges in certain states.
As with all legal doctrines, hard cases can arise under these statutes.
How dangerous is the child’s illness? Are the parents’ objections really
based on religion, as required by the statute? These kinds of issues are
determined on a case-by-case basis.
So consider the following hypothetical case. A single father has a
young daughter with a serious arm injury. The doctor wants to intervene
with antibiotics. The father, who is not affiliated with any organized
religious group and has not been to church for years, suddenly announces
that he will pray over his daughter rather than bring her back to the doctor’s
office. He says that he is hearing voices from God telling him to keep his
daughter at home.
When the matter comes before a judge, she is quite troubled. She is
concerned that the child could have an infection that will become very
serious. She knows that under the statutory exception for religious practice it
should not matter whether the father is a member of an organized church,
but she is concerned that his statements are better described as erratic or
troubled rather than religious.
Suppose now that the state, in an effort to force treatment, introduces
neuroscientific evidence that the father’s experience of hearing voices is
typical of a particular brain abnormality usually viewed as a type of mental
illness. Perhaps the state has even obtained brain scans of the father that
support this view.
I believe it is quite plausible that this neuroscientific evidence could
play a role in the judge deciding that treatment should be given to the
daughter over the father’s objection. Technically, the judge might find that
the father’s objections are not religious under the statute, although the
decision could also involve a stated or unstated concern that the injury could
be potentially life threatening. My point is simply that the neuroscience
might matter to this judge.
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The immediate objection to this prediction is that it appears to flatly
contradict our earlier observation that neuroscience will not undermine
religion. What happened to the arguments we heard a moment ago?
Attributing the voice of God that the father is hearing to a particular part of
his brain should not undermine that voice any more than attributing a
doctor’s brilliant diagnosis to a part of the doctor’s brain should undermine
the diagnosis.
The answer is that there is a contradiction, but it is one that we see in
the law every day. Consider the insanity defense, which negates criminal
liability if because of mental illness an individual cannot tell right from
wrong. 28 Why do we regard an individual as not guilty by reason of insanity
if his moral compass has been thrown off by a mental defect, but not if it has
been impaired by extreme poverty or drug addition? Surely it is the brain
that is implicated in all of these cases.
Or consider the doctrine in some jurisdictions that excuses you from a
contract if you entered into the deal under the compulsion of a mental
disease. 29 To a philosopher or a scientist any contract you made might be
traced back to your genetic endowment, your upbringing, and the latest
advertisements you saw, but that sort of compulsion argument will never
work.
Obviously the courtroom plays fast and loose with deep philosophical
ideas like determinism. The legal system’s treatment of these concepts is
rarely logically consistent. Instead the law treats new scientific theories on a
rather ad hoc basis until some sort of broad societal consensus arises.
There are two primary reasons judicial decision makers do not seek
scientific and philosophical consistency above all else. 30 First, in resolving a
case, a judge is seeking a peaceful and socially acceptable resolution of a
dispute. People need a chance to be heard, values like religious liberty and
child welfare need to be weighed, public understanding needs to be
considered. The accurate resolution of a factual dispute is not the only, or
even the primary, goal.

28
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Secondly, every judge understands that not to decide is a decision. If a
judge said, “I won’t order a young child to receive treatment until there is
complete consensus on the neuroscience underlying the voices the father is
hearing, and full philosophical agreement on whether the father had a real
choice in making his decision,” then no child would ever be treated over the
parent’s objection. And if the judge put the burden on the parent to prove
beyond any doubt his scientific and philosophical assumptions then religious
liberty would never be respected. The law doesn’t have the luxury of
waiting, so it moves along, case by case, making imperfect decisions in the
best way it can.
It is not that there are no relevant legal presumptions here. Whether it
be religious belief, criminal responsibility, or the making of contracts, the
law, as Justice Cardozo put it, begins “with a robust common sense which
assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis.” 31 But, as Cardozo
well knew, there are places where we put this assumption aside.
V. Recent Cases
Although it did not involve religion, there has already been one major
United States Supreme Court case where modern brain science played a role.
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court, in 2005, ruled that it violated the
Constitution for the state of Missouri to execute individuals who were under
the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed. 32 In finding that the
death penalty in those instances constituted cruel and unusual punishment,
the Court relied in part on an amicus brief filed on behalf of scientists and
doctors which argued that adolescent brain development is immature
because the frontal lobe is not fully developed, and it is this part of the brain
that is responsible for impulse control and good judgment. 33
One can already hear the shouts of protests. When the frontal lobe is
fully developed, does that mean that free will magically appears? And does
this maturing of the lobe happily take place precisely when one turns
eighteen? And so on.

31
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But the Court knew all this and more. Its decision drew strength from
the emerging field of neuroscience – and science does lend some prestige to
a judicial ruling – but it relied as well on precedent, on the unwillingness to
execute children in most American states and in most countries around the
world, and on a broader discomfort with the death penalty itself. 34 Even
when the Court referenced the scientific studies, it did so in a cautious way,
embedding them in common sense and legislative judgments:
[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth
more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.” …. In recognition of the comparative
immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State
prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or
marrying without parental consent…. 35
So in the field of law and religion, I would expect neuroscience to
make some limited but important appearances in the years ahead. There
already are some cases of this type. In 2008, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
affirmed a decision by a district court civilly committing Allison Fischer to a
mental institution and ordering the involuntary administration of neuroleptic
medication by that institution.36
At the time of the case, Fischer was a homeless twenty-two year old
with no income. She was asking strangers if she could live with them, was
expressing grandiose ideas such as winning the World Cup, and was not
sleeping regularly. A psychologist testified that she exhibited grossly
disturbed behavior and faulty perception. Although Fischer insisted that she
was not mentally ill, it is not surprising that the Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court holding that she was a danger to self and others and could
be committed and treated.

34
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What gives the case particular interest is that much of Fischer’s
behaviors and perceptions involved religion. Her grandiose ideas included
planning to convert China, Russia, and Africa to Catholicism, she refused to
have blood drawn and to remove her clothes on religious grounds, and she
was described by her mother as being religiously preoccupied. Moreover,
the court did not rely solely on the psychologist presented by the
government. The district court appointed a “certified neuropsychiatrist” who
found among other things that Fischer “is in a manic phase of bipolar
disorder” and that “[s]he does not have the ability to manipulate information
rationally.” 37 In the end both the district and appellate courts brushed aside
Fischer’s explicit freedom of religion claims.
It is not clear from the record what tests this “certified
neuropsychiatrist” used, and it is far from clear that the case would have
come out differently if the neuropsychiatrist had not testified. But this is a
typical example of using science to bolster a case that turns on other factors
as well, and it is clear that neuroscience is available to play that role.
Another straw in the wind is the recent decision in Boone v. Missouri,
in which an inmate resisted participating in a therapy program on the ground
that “the Word of God only has the answers” to his problems and that “only
the Lord Jesus Christ and His Holy Spirit can make any necessary changes
in my life.” 38 Failure to participate in the program lengthened the amount of
time Boone had to spend incarcerated. The court’s rejection of Boone’s
position turned on many factors, but it is worth noting that the Court quoted
without disapproval the finding of a therapist that Boone’s religious
convictions were evidence of “internalized distortions” in his mind. 39
Fischer and Boone are not leading precedents, and they certainly do
not mean that the medical profession is going to begin to view religion
generally as an illness or that courts would have any patience with such an
approach. 40 But they do suggest that in close cases, emerging findings
relating neuroscience to religion may find a role in some judicial contexts.
37
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Given the way the law necessarily works, there is one final paradox
that is worth noting here. Consider the hypothetical case I gave concerning a
father who suddenly hears the voice of God and therefore does not want to
give his daughter traditional medical treatment. Among the factors that a
court would consider in the real world is the fact that the father in my
hypothetical was not a member of an organized religious group. If he were,
by contrast, a life-long Christian Scientist who had come to his views, not
because of sudden voices from above, but because of longstanding study of
standard Christian Science texts, a court would be more reluctant to view his
decision as evidence of mental illness and thus would be more likely to rule
in his favor. And this is independent of whatever a brain scan of the father
would show. The court would be quite understandably reacting to the fact
that the religious exemption to child abuse statutes under consideration were
largely supported by and largely aimed at protecting Christian Science and
similar established groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses. The fact is that no
court is going to medicalize and undermine the religious beliefs of millions
of people.
The paradox becomes clear if we look at this from William James’
point of view. His defense of the authenticity of religious experience was
aimed precisely at the ecstatic and extreme experiences of religious
visionaries. He was quite uninterested in the “second-hand” religious life of
ordinary parishioners. The law views the matter just the other way around,
giving weight to the preferences of well established churches while tending
to devalue the spiritual claims of unorthodox individuals. Odd perhaps, but
an inevitable byproduct of a system in which science is just one input in a
broad effort to resolve cases in a socially acceptable manner.
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